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ABSTRACT 
 
Only 23 out of 63 provinces in Vietnam have established credit guarantee funds since 2001, when Vietnamese government 
encouraged the establishment of provincial credit guarantee funds to support small and medium enterprises. The Credit 
Guarantee Fund which reach the largest small and medium enterprises guarantee for only 105 loans. The article uses 
content analysis method to assess the situation of credit guarantee operation for small and medium enterprises in 
Vietnam. Research shows that guarantee funds are currently not expanding due to the fact that unfavorable guarantee 
regulations do not encourage borrowing under the guarantee of these funds; charter capital is at small scale; cooperation 
between banks and these funds are not based on sharing benefits and risks; inflexible and increative Municipal Credit 
Guarantee Funds. Following the recent findings, the paper suggests recommendations for the policies to strengthen 
the credit accessibility of SMEs in Vietnam. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
To facilitate the access to bank credit of small and medium enterprises, Decree No. 90/2001/NĐ-CP 
on aiding SME development was issued by the Government; regulations that promulgate the establishment, 
organization and operation of credit guarantee funds for small and medium enterprises are also issued in 
Decision No. 193/2001/QĐ-TTg dated 12/20/2001.  
Provincial agencies (People’s Committee, Departments and Agencies) agree that the estalishment of 
credit guarantee fund is important and essential as mentioned in many studies by Thang (2011), Hien (2012). 
But in fact, in the past 14 years, Vietnam has only established 23 funds (including Binh Thuan credit guarantee 
fund which was founded in 2007 and dissolved in 2014). The highest number of enterprises receiving fund 
from one credit guarantee fund is 105 enterprises. It is, therefore, necessary to study the constraints to promoting 
the establishment of a credit guarantee fund to facilitate access to capital for small and medium enterprises. 
Deelen and Molenaar (2004), OECD (2009) suggest that there are many indicators to assess the 
guarantee status, such as the number of guarantee certificate, the guaranteed amount, the repayment of debt 
on behalf of customer, the ratio of mandatory loans/total guarantees, weightage, the ratioof guarantee fee/ 
total revenue of the guarantor. 
There are many factors affecting the guarantee activities in general and credit guarantees for SME 
loans at commercial banks, including policies, capacity of credit institutions, capacity of the guaranteed 
businesses, capacity of guarantors (Hahm and Kang, 2006; OECD, 2009). In this study, the authors limit 
the study to the assessment of policy and capacity of credit guarantee funds.  
To build the foundation for credit guarantee modeling, there should have a solid legal framework, 
transparent political institutions working for the interests of the nation. The role of government should be 
limited to the establishment of legal environment and offering technical assistance in a short term period, 
after which the credit guarantee model should operate independently. The participation of private sector 
such as credit institutions should be encouraged into the credit guarantee model to increase the monitoring 
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and responsibility between the guarantee and the guarantor, sharing the risks of the guarantor (Hahm and 
Kang, 2006; OECD, 2009). 
In BIS (2006), there were many factors within credit guarantee institutions that affect the guarantee 
activities of those organizations, including: the ability to maintain and control their activities; effective 
internal risk management; the synergies with partnered banks. Experience from other countries also shows 
that nonprofit organizations vary in mission, scale, mode of operation and impact. Anheier (2000), Salamon and 
Anheier (1997), Susannah (2000) stated that non-profit organizations often share the key characteristics: (i) 
privately held organization (unless being separately regulated by the government, outside the public sector) 
and mainly financed by fees and contributions; (ii) no distribution of profits to the owners or similar entities; (iii) 
self-management; (iv) voluntary (Gary, 2011). Xie and Li (2011) stressed that the advantages of the US 
and Japan in the development of credit guarantee business is their clear direction (focusing on projects operating 
according to the policies of the state or on special purposed organizations, such as for women, the disabled, 
the poor, veterans), risk sharing commitment, no interference in decision making process of credit guarantee 
organizations besides the establishment of a complete legal system to regulate the credit guarantee operation for 
small and medium enterprises. According to Ngoc (2011), Taiwan, South Korea and Indonesia have 
established central guarantee fund in addition to the local guarantee funds. In particular, Taiwan has 
established guarantee fund for small and medium enterprises with the initial capital contribution mainly 
from government (79%), commercial banks (19%) and other financial institutions (2%). The fund’s 
operation does not emphasize profit targets but more on efficiency and diversity to offset operational risk 
from credit guarantee. South Korean Guarantee Fund was set up with 50% or more from state capital. Their 
nationwide offices across South Korea focus on preserving capital and providing consulting services and 
training to medium and small businesses using their guarantee fund. Indonesian Credit Guarantee Fund 
during 1993 - 1994 generated serious losses and was stopped for 2 years to review and study the experiences of 
other organizations to overcome losses by incorporating at a certain proportion Central Guarantee Fund and 
Local Guarantee Fund to co-guarantee for the credits and support more effectively for small and medium 
enterprises. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Content analysis method was used primarily in this study. Due to the lack of systematic statistics and 
information on the research issue being scattered from various sources, the author has used content analysis 
method as mentioned in the documents by White and Marsh (2006), Krippendorff (2013) to consolidate 
information about the operation of credit guarantee funds in Vietnam into an overall picture. Qualitative data 
were compiled from many sources including regulatory documents and other documents issued by provincial 
People's Committee (decisions on establishment; projects; resolutions by People’s Councils to pass the project, 
the fund's charter, and guarantee regulations), activity reports of the funds from the web portal of the provinces, 
interviews of fund operation expert, and electronic newspaper articles. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Establishment and development of credit guarantee fund 
After the Decree No. 90/2001/NĐ-CP from the Government dated 23/11/2001 on aiding the 
development of enterprises (which was later replaced by Decree No. 56/2009/ NĐ-CP dated 23/11/2001), only one 
fund was founded: Tra Vinh Fund was established by decision of the provincial People's Committee No. 62/2002/
QĐ-UBT dated 21/11/2002.  
As of 2010, there were only 7 Credit Guarantee Funds: Tra Vinh (21/12/2002); Yen Bai (04/03/2005); Ha 
Noi (14/4/2006); Ho Chi Minh City (08/03/2006); Vinh Phuc (11/5/2007) (Minh Duc, 2010), Binh 
Thuan (2007). In 2012, the Institute of Strategy and Finance Policy (2012) reported 11 guarantee funds.  
In 2014, 9 funds were established: Can Tho (8/2014), Da Nang (31/12/2013), Soc Trang (6/2014), Tien 
Giang (11/2014, a new department was established within the Investment and Development Fund to perform 
credit guarantee functions), Dong Thap (10/2014). According to the author's consolidation by 07/2015, 
there are 22 credit guarantee funds and organizations having credit guarantee function in Vietnam.  
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Many funds established before 2014 were dissolved, such as Binh Thuan CGF; or additional 
functions were included to become a local investment and development fund, such as in Tra Vinh. Except 
for a few funds having more than 100 guaranteed businesses, such as Ha Giang, or a few having regular 
guarantees, such as Bac Ninh  (which guarantees for 20 enterprises annually, accounting for 0.4% of all 
companies in the province (Huyen and Hai, 2015)), most other funds have few guaranteed businesses; some 
funds register mandatory loans. Hanoi Fund to date only guaranteed for one company, the Ho Chi Minh 
City Fund in 2014 did not have any new guarantee (HCGF, 2014). Can Tho Fund was established since 
8/2014 but until 01/2015, it did not issue any credit guarantee for businesses. In addition to the lack of a 
mechanism for periodic reports, this is another reason that makes it difficult to access financial information 
of the funds. 
The fund’s revenue comes from filing fee for credit guarantee (Tra Vinh, Hoa Binh, Ha Giang, Ninh 
Thuan charges 500,000, 300,000, 200,000, 50,000 VND respectively), insurance premiums from 0.5% (Tra 
Vinh, Kien Giang) to 1% (Ha Giang) and most commonly at 0.8%. These sources of revenue are small due 
to few customers; they are not enough for sustainable development activities. Funds’ main revenue is from 
depositing capital in the bank to cover for their daily operations.  
 
Factors affecting the operation of the guarantee fund 
 
The legal framework  
 
The legal framework to support credit guarantee activities for businesses is constantly under review. 
Most recently there are Decision No. 58/2013/QĐ-TTg dated 15/10/2013 issued by the Prime Minister promulgating 
the Regulation on the establishment, organization and operation of Credit Guarantee Fund and Circular No. 
147/2014/TT-BTC dated 08/10/2014 to guide the implementation of the Decision 58. Despite recently issued, 
Decision 58 still poses difficulties in guarantee conditions and complicated procedures. 
According to reports from the funds in Can Tho, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, and Ha Noi, the 
biggest problem in implementing guarantee activities is provisions on collateral and capital preservation. 
According to Decision No. 58/2013/QĐ-TTg of the Prime Minister and the Operating Charter of the Fund, 
for the business to be guaranteed, it must have available assets or future assets as collateral.  
Many funds receive applications from businesses but could not offer guarantee due to regulations on 
collateral such as funds in Can Tho, HCMC... In fact, if a business has sufficient resources as defined 
above it may mortgage to the bank rather than applying for guarantee; what the business needs is credit 
guarantee without collateral. As for assets created in the future, it only applies to investment loans; short-term 
purchase contract does not create this type of asset. 
 
Operating terms 
 
Under the provisions of Decision No. 193/2001/QĐ-TTg and Decision No. 115/2004/QĐ-TTg, the operation 
of the Fund is entrusted to the Development Assistance Fund; assigned or delegated to local financial funds. In fact, 
at the moment, credit guarantee fund has three modes of operation: (i) 10 funds operate ndependently; 
(ii) 6 funds offer credit guarantees for small and medium enterprises as part of the operation of the local 
investment and development funds; (iii) one is a trust fund operating under a development bank, one under 
a commercial bank and 4 under local development fund (Table 1). 
All three modes of operation need to be adjusted. For independent funds, they are in fact not yet fully 
independent. The independently operated funds are organized based on the structure of Management Board 
and the Executive Board. However, members of the Management Board and the Executive Board are 
mostly part-time officers from the People’s Committee and other municipal, provincial departments. Chairman 
of the Management Board is Deputy Chairman of People’s Committee (Vinh Phuc, Tra Vinh), or Director 
of Finance Department (Yen Bai).  
For trust funds (or local investment and development funds having the function of credit guarantee), 
the assignment to local financial funds only saves initial set-up cost due to lower human resources, but hinders 
the operation of the Investment and Development Funds. They lack initiatives; the board is not specialized; 
they must balance with the general interest of the Development Assistance Fund or local financial funds; they 
lack professional development; commitment from officers working for credit guarantee function is not high 
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due to direct comparison with officers working for investment and development function. Besides, most of 
the staff of the fund does not have much practical experience in appraisal, or experience in evaluating different 
industries. The funds rely on the Ministry of Finance to support with such activities as professional training, 
study tours or to promulgate guidelines on guarantee operations (regulations, process, and contract form), 
and accounting operations, which lead to many difficulties in the operation process.  
 
Charter capital 
 
One of the difficulties in the establishment of a credit guarantee fund in the provinces is charter capital 
contribution at a minimum of 30 billion dongs. Currently, there are 16 funds having charter capital less than 
60 billion dongs, two independent operating funds having charter capital more than 100 billion dongs (HCMC 
and Thanh Hoa Fund), four remaining funds with a charter capital more than 100 billion are investment and 
development funds that also provide credit guarantee. In fact, working capital may be even smaller than the 
charter capital (Thanh Hoa Fund was granted 75 billion, lacking 25 billion; Ha Tinh Fund was granted 
30 billion, lacking 10 billion, Can Tho Fund was granted 60 billion, lacking 10 billion). Limited capital 
resources also impact on their creating trust with banks and their guarantee services for fear of high risk. 
Table 1: Characteristics of the Investment and Development Fund 
No. Provinces Charter  capital Establishment year Mode of operation 
 1 Ha Giang 100 2010 
Investment & development (ID), 
Land Development (LD), Credit 
Guarantee (CG) 
 2 Lang Son 38 2014 Independent 
 3 Ha Noi 30 2006 Independent 
 4 Yen Bai   2005 Independent 
 5 Vinh Phuc 600 (100) 2007 CG, ID 
 6 Bac Ninh 30 2008 Independent 
 7 Peace 30 2014 Trust to VDB 
 8 Hallowmas 100 2013 Independent 
 9 Ha Tinh 40 2015 Independent 
 10 Hue 326.8 2015 ID, CG 
11 Danang 30 2013 Trust 
12 Pacify 30 2014 Trust 
 13 Ninh Thuan 30 2008 Independent 
 14 Ho Chi Minh City 300 2006 Independent 
 15 Dong Nai 30 2014 Trust 
 16 Tien Giang 440 (30) 2014 ID 
 17 Tra Vinh 130 2002 ID 
 18 Dong Thap 30 2014 ID 
 19 Can Tho 60 2014 Independent 
 20 Soc Trang 30 2014 Agribank 
 21 Kien Giang   2008 Independent 
 22 Bac Lieu 50 2012 Investment Trust 
Source: Compiled by the author from legal documents and interviews with experts. 
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The minimum charter capital of 30 billion dongs that applies equally to all provinces is not reasonable 
and does not take into consideration the capability and economic conditions of each province. Provincial 
government agrees that it is necessary to establish a credit guarantee fund for SMEs; but a minimum charter 
capital of 30 billion dongs for big cities like Ho Chi Minh City, Ha Noi, Binh Duong, Hai Phong is too little, 
but for others (two thirds of the total 64 provinces and cities are not yet financially independent), it is difficult 
to arrange enough capital from provincial budget. Many provinces have few businesses and find it difficult 
to have enough capital from provincial budget to fund for the full 30 billion dongs. The limited local budget 
leads to difficulty in capital contributions despite written guidance from the state: in Document No. 07/TTg- 
KTTH dated 03/01/2013 on credit guarantee for SMEs, the Prime Minister has agreed in principle to use 
revenue from equitisation of local businesses (revenue payable to acquisition support and enterprise 
development fund) to strengthen the financial capability of local credit guarantee fund. Specific deployment 
plans are to be proposed by the provincial People’s Committee to the Ministry of Finance for review and 
submission to the Prime Minister for consideration and decision. In addition, on 06/03/2013, Ministry of 
Finance issued Document No. 2940/BTC-TCDN to provincial People's Committee on the report of credit 
guarantee activities for SMEs in order to review, evaluate, and propose measures to strengthen the financial 
resources of local credit guarantee fund before reporting to the Prime Minister. 
According to Decision 58, credit guarantee funds may cooperate with associations of enterprises, 
especially small and medium-sized enterprises, to guarantee its member for bank loans. However, in 
practice these associations have no financial capacity, and could not contribute capital or guarantee their 
members for loans. Businesses do not want to contribute capital because their capital is limited and 
capital contributed to credit guarantee fund does not have high returns; if they are eligible for bank loans 
they will not join the guarantee for an additional fee.  
 
Possibilities of coordinating activities with banks 
 
Coordination between credit guarantee funds and banks is often through capital contributions or 
co-guarantee.  
 
Capital contribution 
  
Document No. 1070/NHNN-TD dated 03/10/2002 on implementing a number of provisions related 
to the establishment of a credit guarantee fund for small and medium-sized enterprises; Circular No. 01/2006/
TT-NHNN dated 20/02/2006 of the Governor of the SBV mentioned that commercial banks contribute 
capital to the credit guarantee Fund.  
In fact, banks do not pay attention to the contribution of capital to the credit guarantee fund. In HCMC, 
it is committed that each commercial bank contributes a minimum amount of 5 billion dongs to the fund. In 
reality, except for one state-owned bank who contributed 1 billion, the remaining banks only contributed a few 
hundred million dongs. In Can Tho, "Many banks claim that the operation terms are too complicated, and 
that they do not enough manpower to appraise the application and be responsible for the loan. So up to now, 
the Fund does not receive any capital contribution from banks" (Gia Bao, 2015). Currently, Circular No. 
05/2015/TT-NHNN dated 04/05/2015 guiding the collaboration of credit institutions with credit guarantee 
funds for loans guaranteed by credit guarantee funds as defined in Decision No. 58/2013/QĐ-TTg dated 
15/10/2013 of the Prime Minister does not mention the contribution of capital. Thus, the capital contribution 
is not mandatory. The author also support this view because credit guarantee funds operate on different 
principles from commercial banks in terms of economic incentives and social charitable causes: (i) the operation 
of guarantee funds is non-profitable, therefore banks will not benefit from the contribution of capital to 
the fund; (ii) banks operate in other activities with higher margins; (iii) local banks are bound by decisions of 
the head office (some bank branches are dealing directly with credit funds, while others have to wait for 
approval from head office). In HCMC, even when the credit guarantee fund for small and medium enterprises 
splits the profits (including profit from saving accounts) with the contributing banks against its non-profitable 
principle, it could not attract the banks. On the other hand, there is no regulation from the Government on the 
withdrawal or transfer of capital from organizations and individuals after contributing. Commercial bank is 
a business unit, so it is not appropriate to request banks to contribute to non-profit activities of credit 
guarantee funds. 
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Connection  
 
 Support from the banks is limited to central bank, provincial branch, urging commercial banks in the 
province to sign a memorandum to contribute capital to credit guarantee fund for the SMEs, to coordinate 
and cooperate to facilitate capital access of businesses. After signing the memorandum, credit guarantee funds 
for small and medium enterprises will work with each commercial bank to agree on the appraisal regulations to 
reduce the procedures for businesses while maintaining the operation procedures of individual banks. This 
support is seen in few provinces such as Da Nang; in Soc Trang, the coordination is close when the fund 
assign the appraisal to Agribank, Soc Trang branch. Other provinces do not have this support. In Bac Ninh, 
although the fund has worked directly with all the banks in the province to co-guarantee, but besides Agribank, 
Vietcombank, BIDV, MHB, VPBank, other banks have not yet coordinated with the fund to provide credit 
guarantee; some bank system does not accept letter of guarantee as collateral (Le Thanh, 2013). 
 
Direction for development of credit guarantee fund 
 
First, it is not necessary to establish a fund, and it is advisable to dissolve or merge into local 
investment and development funds or Development Bank if its operation is not efficient. Besides, based on 
demands of local businesses in big cities as Da Nang, Ha Noi, Can Tho, Ho Chi Minh City, the funds are 
proposed to have bid security function and  other types of guarantees. To enable this function, the fund 
should be determined as having sufficient capacity for bid security as well as having well implemented 
credit guarantee function. 
Second, it is necessary to examine the needs before establishing the fund and to provide information about 
the fund to partners such as credit organizations and business enterprises. Currently the credit guarantee 
funds for small and medium businesses comply with the decrees from the State that boast “for the business 
enterprises” rather than “by the enterprises,” so the enterprises receive little information about these funds. 
Proposals to establish credit guarantee funds do not survey the needs of businesses for guarantee activities 
but mainly use secondary data from provincial departments. 
Third, in the long run it is necessary to have a consistent system of credit guarantee funds to leverage 
economies of scale and an affiliated network of business associations. In short term, the funds can 
continue with their fragmented model that is individually adjusted according to provincial conditions; there 
should be an open mechanism to the operation of the fund due to different characteristics in each province. 
There should be consistency in the operational management of the fund, such as operational information, 
statistics, regulations on operational terms and processes to ensure financial security and timely statistical 
information. Besides, the participation of foreign capital as mentioned in Decision No. 58/2013/QĐ-TTg 
on establishment of credit guarantee funds from the central to local levels should be governed by a 
written document of higher legality, which is the Law of Credit Guarantee for SMEs. 
 
Proposals to improve the factors affecting the development of the guarantee funds 
 
For credit guarantee funds to operate effectively, it is necessary to have synergy from Central to 
local levels. Legislation needs to be flexible and give funds the autonomy. Guidelines should be more 
flexible in guarantee terms and fee. While waiting for new guidelines, the funds should actively adjust their 
operation to suit the actual situation in their provinces. Funds need to be proactive in their operations. Some 
examples are given in Box 1. 
  
Collateral 
 
Funds should be given autonomy in deciding collateral. Enterprises applying for guarantees from 
the fund do not necessarily have collateral; the funds will appraise based on financial capability, the 
effectiveness of the project and their understanding of the business. The funds may not need collateral and have 
flexibility in deciding guaranteed amount or guaranteed ratio based on their risk assessment. In fact, Da Nang 
has applied that “In the case that businesses do not have collateral but have effective production plan, transparent 
financial situation, no bad debts or tax debts, the fund is allowed to provide guarantee in the form of unsecured 
loans with a maximum of 2 billion dongs” (Nhung, 2014). 
Dao 
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It should be maintained that “Credit guarantee fund is a financial institution established and contributed 
mainly by the State, aiming to promote economic growth through credit guarantee for enterprises. Credit 
guarantee fund should operate for non-profit purposes”. However operations of non-profit organization 
should follow international rules (which is difficult to execute because sometimes the objectives and activities 
are in opposite directions), which means that shareholder relationship is non-profit in principle, but the 
organizational structure is similar to a for-profit organization to motivate teams and individuals. Funding 
should come from State budget because: (i) policy will be consistent and support to businesses will be 
better executed; (ii) small and medium enterprises in particular, and business enterprises in general operate 
for profits, state budget then has revenue to to redistribute to businesses from their contributions: (iii) in the initial 
stage when credit guarantee is risky and less profitable, it is appropriate that the State plays a key role in this non-
profit activity. In the long term, the funds should be converted to operating units with the participate of relevant 
partners depending on the operational scale of the fund. Small funds can not be equal partners with major banks. 
In addition, the use of state budget should be reviewed. Budget from the State should not be used as savings 
accounts to extract interest; the funds have to be active in finding customers. Operating model of the fund should 
be similar to a joint-stock company, in which additional capital is generated from the amount of interest on 
the capital from the provincial or Central budget, and whose mechanisms encourage businesses and credit 
organizations voluntarily contribute capital. 
Box 1: Lessons learned from the funds 
Yen Bai 
The province applied soft and hard measures, persuasion as well as serious administrative measures to 
ensure sufficient capital contribution by three differnt stakeholders (state budget – financial institutions – 
business enterprises), developed guarantee process, operational terms and started credit guarantee activities 
immediately after its establishment. 
Soc Trang 
Soc Trang Fund is newly established but is one of the few fund that has its own website. Its credit 
guarantee activities is practical to the operation of small and medium enterprises. The fund's charter capital is 
50% from state budget and 50% from Soc Trang development fund for small and medium enterprises 
(funds from non-governmental organizations). The fund has many breakthroughs in operation which are shown 
very clearly on the fund's website. This is the only fund that loans directly through banks. Entrusting to 
Agribank Soc Trang is not compliance with Decision 58 but it operates very efficiently and is appreciated 
by donors. 
Ha Giang 
On 24/12/2010 Ha Giang Provincial People's Committee issued Decision No. 4120/QĐ-UBND to 
establish Fund for Investment, Land Development and Credit Guarantee in Ha Giang Province on the basis of 
consolidating the organizational structure of Guarantee Credit Fund for small and medium enterprises in 
Ha Giang Province and add more functions and responsibilities to local Investment and Development 
Fund, Land Development Fund under Decree No. 138/2007/NĐ-CP of the Government and Decision No. 
40/QĐ-TTg dated 10/05/2010 of the Prime Minister. In 2014, Fund for Investment, Land Development 
and Credit Guarantee in Ha Giang Province received 109 applications for credit guarantee, in which 105 
applications were evaluated and accepted, 04 applications were rejected for not meeting the requirements 
or not being the right target. Guaranteed amount reached 51,166 million dongs (102% of annual plan). 
Revenues in 2014 reached 8,287 million dongs (107% of annual plan), of which interest income from 
investment loans reached 4,839 million dongs (104% of the plan), interest income from compulsory loans 
reached 46.7 million dongs, operation fee reached 99.5% of the plan. Total expenses reached 7,493 million 
dong (111% compared to 2013), Revenue – Expenses gap: 793,9/766,8 million dong (104% of the plan), 
contribution 143 million dongs to State budget (excise duty, personal income tax, registration tax) (286% 
of plan). The fund was assessed as effective and operated in compliance with commitments SBV. 
Source: Compiled by author from Duc Cuong (2015), Duc Nghiem (2015) 
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Relationship between fund and bank 
 
The connection between the bank and the fund is based on shared risk and responsibility. Credit guarantee 
funds provide loan security and thus create a safe output for the banks and unfreeze the flow of capital to help 
the businesses in a most practical way. That does not mean the funds will bear all the risks and the banks 
reap all the benefits. There should be a risk-sharing mechanism: (i) to ensure relevant parties share the risks, 
but there should flexibility in the level of guarantee depending on credit rating of each enterprise. Currently, 
Article 15 and Article 16, Chapter IV, Decision No. 58 stipulates in “conditions for guarantee and guarantee 
level” that “Credit Guarantee Fund only guarantees a maximum of 80% of the difference between the loan 
and collateral value. The maximum credit guarantee level for a customer does not exceed 15% of the 
Fund's equity”; (ii) Credit institutions having professional human resources are more experience in appraisal; 
(iii) the fund should immediately compensate to the credit institution if the business is unable to pay on 
time to preserve credibility and change the bank's point of view about risks in providing guaranteed loans. 
Currently the bank has yet to consider the guaranteed loans as low risk, so with guarantee certificate, banks 
still charge similar interest rates as conventional loans, i.e. the enterprise must bear higher interest rate than 
loan with collateral due to guarantee fee. This is not reasonable for the guaranteed loan has greatly reduced 
risks for the bank. However, to change this perspective takes a long time to build trust between the parties 
and to share risks and responsibilities between the parties.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The guarantee funds are currently not expanding due to the fact that unfavorable guarantee regulations do 
not encourage borrowing under the guarantee of these funds. Charter-capital is at small scale and the 
cooperation between banks and these funds are not based on sharing benefits and risks; inflexible and in-
creative Municipal Credit Guarantee Funds. 
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